Using the Financial Secrecy Index for Assessing the Vulnerability and Exposure to Illicit Financial Flows risk in Africa

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Summary

> Concepts

Financial Secrecy Index (Methodology, Data Sources and Findings)

 Vulnerability and Exposure to Illicit Financial Flows risk in Africa (Methodology, Data Sources and Findings)

Stop the Bleeding Campaign



Concepts





□ What is the meaning of Financial Secrecy ?

□ How many billions of dollars African Countries lost annually through

illicit financial flows ?

- \checkmark \$100 billion
- ✓ \$50 billion
- ✓ \$30 billion

□ Where is Corruption ?





Financial Secrecy

Refusal to share financial information with legitimate authorities

- Bank secrecy
- Corporate secrecy
- Non-cooperation

Illicit Financial Flows

- Proceeds of crime or corruption
- Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning
- Hidding wealth from public agencies, business associates, or family members

Offshore activities

• Opacity


- Complexity of the structures
- Difficulties and divergences in interpreting the Law
- Weak political support for the Law enforcement

"In Africa, estimates suggest that as much as \$50 billion is lost annually through illicit financial flows"

Where is corruption?

Corruption Perception Index

r



Financial Secrecy Index


- □ 112 Jurisdictions including 9 African Countries
- Sources of Data : official and public reports by the OECD, the associated Global Forum, the FATF, the IMF, the IBFD, PwC, Lowtax and

Surveys (sent to the Ministries of Finance and the Financial Intelligence Units).

20 Financial secrecy indicators (KFSIs).

| Ow | nership Registration | | gal Entity Insparency | | rity of tax and financial lation | | mational Standards Cooperation |
|----|---------------------------------------|----|---------------------------------|----|-------------------------------------|----|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Banking secrecy | 1 | Public Company Ownership | 11 | Tax Administration Capacity | 17 | Anti-money Laundering |
| 2 | Trusts and Foundations Register | 1 | Public Company Accounts | 12 | Consistent Personal Income Tax | 18 | Automatic Information Exchange |
| 3 | Recorded Company Ownership | | Country by Country Reporting | 1 | Avoids Promoting Tax Evasion | 19 | Bilateral Treaties |
| 4 | Other Wealth ownership | 9 | Corporate Tax Disclosure | 14 | Tax Court Secrecy | 20 | International Legal Cooperation |
| 5 | Limited Partnership Transparency | 10 | Legal Entity Identifier | 15 | Harmful Structures | | Lowest available |
| | | | | 16 | Public Statistics | | transparency denominator!! |








Global Secrecy Weight (share of exports of financial services)

G Formula :

 $FSI \ 2018_i = SS_i^3 * \sqrt[3]{GSW_i}$ = Cube of the SS * Cube root of the GSW

The FSI Performance of African Countries




9

What does the FSI offer?

| Rank | Jurisdiction | FSI - Value ⁶ | FSI Share ⁷ | Secrecy Score ⁴ | Global Scale Weight ⁵ |
|------|--|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1 | Switzerland ² | 1,589.57 | 5.01% | 76 | 4.50% |
| 2 | [▶] USA ² | <u>1,298.47</u> | 4.09% | 60 | 22.30% |
| 3 | Cayman Islands ² | <u>1.267.68</u> | 3.99% | 72 | 3.78% |
| 4 | Hong Kong ² | <u>1.243.67</u> | 3.92% | 71 | 4.16% |
| 5 | Singapore ² | <u>1.081.98</u> | 3.41% | 67 | 4.57% |
| 6 | Luxembourg ² | <u>975.91</u> | 3.07% | 58 | 12.13% |
| 7 | Bermany ² | <u>768.95</u> | 2.42% | 59 | 5.16% |
| 8 | Taiwan ² | <u>743.37</u> | 2.34% | 76 | 0.50% |
| 9 | United Arab Emirates (Dubai) ^{2,3} | <u>661.14</u> | 2.08% | 84 | 0.14% |
| 10 | ▲ Guernsey ² | <u>658.91</u> | 2.07% | 72 | 0.52% |
| 11 | Lebanon ² | <u>644.41</u> | 2.03% | 72 | 0.51% |
| 12 | Panama ² | <u>625.84</u> | 1.97% | 77 | 0.26% |
| 13 | Japan ² | <u>623.91</u> | 1.96% | 60 | 2.23% |
| 14 | Netherlands ² | <u>598.80</u> | 1.88% | 66 | 0.90% |
| 15 | Thailand | <u>550.59</u> | 1.73% | 80 | 0.12% |
| 16 | British Virgin Islands ² | <u>502.75</u> | 1.58% | 69 | 0.37% |
| 17 | Bahrain ² | <u>490.70</u> | 1.54% | 78 | 0.11% |
| 18 | | <u>438.21</u> | 1.38% | 65 | 0.38% |
| 19 | Bahamas | <u>429.00</u> | 1.35% | 84 | 0.03% |
| 20 | <u>Malta</u> | <u>426.31</u> | 1.34% | 61 | 0.71% |
| 21 | 📕 Canada ² | <u>425.84</u> | 1.34% | 55 | 1.74% |
| 22 | <u>Macao</u> | <u>424.91</u> | 1.34% | 68 | 0.23% |
| 23 | United Kingdom ² | <u>423.76</u> | 1.33% | 42 | 17.36% |
| 24 | Cyprus ² | <u>404.44</u> | 1.27% | 61 | 0.54% |
| 25 | France | 404.17 | 1.27% | 52 | 2.52% |

| NARRATIVE REPORT ON TAIWAN |
|---|
| PART 1: NARRATIVE REPORT |
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| The Tax Justice Network started covering Talwan in our 2015 FSI. In that edition the amount of data we could find on the country was too poor |
| minimal supervision, little regulation, in secrecy and subject to no taxes. At the bagining, burners a banking burners could not be used by Taiwanse residents. As a result, in the early years the CBU burners and not go well, as Taiwance banks could do that to bursk into the space dominated by more well known international payers. However, Taiwance companies were able to use OBUs when of thorse usedularies and with the emergence of Chnais economy during positives in the opening up of oversats burnes usuits to strate detable banking services in the |



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| | 29 | | 10 Basic Da | | | | TN | Taivan | | | Chinese (c | | *WWE | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 30 | | 10 Basic Da | | | | TN | Taivan | 2 | Roman | | Lkup | *WWR | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | - 10 | | ið Basic Daf | | | | TN | Taivan | | | 2015 (est | led | *WWR | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | - 7 | | ið Basic Daf | | | | TN | Taivan | | Unknown | | Nati | | | | | idex and its | | | | | | |
| L | í | | 10 Basic Dal | Funani | h HDI Rank | 221 | TN | Taivan | | Unknown | | Nam | *WWR | 199C H | man Dev | sconnent in | idex and its | compose | nts, Table : | 1 | | | |
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| | 3 | 1 | 10 Basic Dal | Funanî | h Adult Diz | 227 | TN | Taivan | 98.5 | | | NunRC | *WWR | 192.0 | World R | edbook | | | | | | | |
| | 21 | | 10 Basic Dal | | | | TN | Taivan | 33.6 | | | NunPC | *WWR | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | 358 | | 10 Basic Dal | | | | TN | Taivan | | Unknown | | Num | *WWR | '90: U | OP/HDR | 3006:206 | 308, table i | | | | | | |
| L | 15 | | 10 Basic Dat | | | | TN | Taivan | 4810 | | 2017 (est | | *WWE | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | 24 | | 10 Baxic Da | | | 227 | TN | Taivan | 45 | | 2015 (est | NunR | *WWE | 190:0 | World R | ethook | | | | | | | |
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| L | ă | 13 | iO Basic Da | sEnployn | n Senices | 227 | TV | Taivan | 99.2 | | | | *WWE | 190:0 | A World R | etbook | | | | | | | |
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Open Data

https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introducti on/fsi-2018-results

Ranking



Interactive Map https://www.financialsecrec yindex.com/detailedmap/


Narrative Reports https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/explore

SECR

All 20 KFSI Indicators

https://www.financialsecrecyindex .com/database/menu.xml

https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/explore/excel



Archive to track progress/worsening https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/archive

Technical Reports

Vulnerability and Exposure to Illicit Financial Flows risk in Africa

TAX JUSTICE Network

AFRICA



"By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized" UN Sustainable Development Goals, target 16.4

- Increasing interest in estimating the magnitude of IFFs (data problems, large error margins).
- Failure of attempts to create 'tax haven' blacklists by international organisations.
- Unhelpful simplification of a complex issue when attempting to separate 'tax havens' (bad actors) from all others (good actors, by implication).
- Motivation: identifying channels responsible for most IFFs in individual countries, and which economic partner jurisdictions are relevant for curtailing them.



Contributions

- ➤ Creating proxies for IFF risk combining bilateral data on trade, investment and banking stocks and flows, with measures of financial secrecy in the partner jurisdiction.
- ➢ Allowing granular comparison of IFF risks across countries and major IFF channels.
- Offering clear signposts guiding individual country's audit activity and international tax policy and negotiation priorities.

Methodology

Let's assume:

- $i \in \{1,...,I\}$ = reporting country
- $j \in \{1,...,J\}$ = partner country
- $t \in \{2008, ..., 2018\}$ = year
- X_{ijt} =flow or stock value of cross-border transaction between reporter *i* and partner *j* at time *t*
- Y_{it} = GDP of reporting country i at time t
- SS_j = Secrecy Score (or individual KFSI) of partner country j

$$Vulnerability = V_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}} \quad \text{ntensity} = I_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}}{Y_{it}} \quad \text{xposure} = E_{it} = V_{it} \cdot I_{it}$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}} \cdot \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt}}{Y_{it}}$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} X_{ijt} \cdot SS_j}{Y_{it}}$$

Data Sources


- Period: 2008-2018
- Data on banking positions: Bank for International Settlements
- Data on direct investment positions: IMF's Coordinated Direct Investment Survey
- Data on portfolio investment holdings: the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
- Data on trade: UN Comtrade database
- Data on countries' GDP: World Development Indicators of the World Bank
- Data on Financial Secrecy Index: TJN

Data limitations in Africa !!!


| IFF Channel / Dataset | Number of African | Coverage |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| | reporter jurisdictions | (%, out of |
| | with data at least one | 60) |
| | observation 2008-2018* | |
| Banking Claims | | 1.7% |
| Banking Liabilities | | 1.7% |
| Portfolio Assets | | 5.0% |
| *if secrecy scores of part | rner jurisdiction is also avai | ilable. |



Findings: Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs




Findings: Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs (2008-2018)



Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs through Trade in Goods (2016)


Illicit motivations: Tax, Money Laundering, Corruption (Pricing, Quantity, Quality of traded goods in customs declaration forms; Bribing or putting pressure on custom officials).



| Moderately | Secrecy Score | Extremely |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Secretive 0 – 0,40 | 0,41 - 0,50 | 0,51 – 0,60 | 0,61 – 0,70 | 0,71 – 0,80 | 0,81 – 0,90 | Secretive 0,91 – 1 |

Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs through Foreign Direct Investment (2016)


Illicit motivations: Tax, Money Laundering, Corruption (profit shifting and base erosion techniques, questionable positions in tax returns, Hiding origin of proceeds of crime, Omission of identities behind foreign investor).



| Moderately | Secrecy Score | Extremely |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Secretive 0 – 0,40 | 0,41 - 0,50 | 0,51 – 0,60 | 0,61 – 0,70 | 0,71 - 0,80 | 0,81 - 0,90 | Secretive 0,91 – 1 |

Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs through Financial Assets (2016)


Illicit motivation: Money Laundering



| Moderately | Secrecy Score | Extremely |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| Secretive 0 – 0,40 | 0,41 - 0,50 | 0,51 – 0,60 | 0,61 – 0,70 | 0,71 – 0,80 | 0,81 – 0,90 | Secretive 0,91 – |

Africa's vulnerability and exposure to IFFs through Banking deposits (2016)

Illicit motivation: Tax, Money Laundering, Corruption (Omission of transfers and/or foreign assets and/or income in tax returns, Thin capitalization, Hiding the origin of proceeds of crime and Corruption).



| Moderately | Secrecy Score | Extremely |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Secretive 0 – 0,40 | 0,41-0,50 | 0,51-0,60 | 0,61 – 0,70 | 0,71 - 0,80 | 0,81 - 0,90 | Secretive 0,91 – 1 |

21

Country-risk profile : Burkina Faso

Table: Vulnerability of Burkina Faso's Exports in 2016

| | | Bu | rkina Faso | _ | |
|------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Rank | Country | Secrecy Score | Vulnerability Share | Exports (m) (USD) | Share of Exports |
| 1 | Switzerland | 76 | 70.8% | 1495.7 | 65.0% |
| 2 | Singapore | 67 | 9.6% | 230.1 | 10.0% |
| 3 | India | 52 | 4.2% | 130.0 | 5.6% |
| 4 | South Africa | 56 | 3.2% | 90.9 | 4.0% |
| 5 | Ghana | 62 | 2.3% | 59.0 | 2.6% |
| 6 | France | 52 | 2.1% | 65.9 | 2.9% |
| 7 | China | 60 | 1.6% | 41.9 | 1.8% |
| 8 | Greece | 58 | 1.5% | 43.1 | 1.9% |
| 9 | United Kingdom | 42 | 1.0% | 37.5 | 1.6% |
| 10 | Denmark | 53 | 0.8% | 25.8 | 1.1% |
| | | Overall vul | nerability of exports 70 | | |

Table: Vulnerability of Burkina Faso's Outward FDI foreign direct investment in 2016

| | | Burkina Faso | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|----------|
| Jurisdiction | SS | Outward FDI Stock (USD) | VulShare |
| Singapore | 67 | 6983337 | 60% |
| China | 60 | 1221943 | 9% |
| Mauritius 🛛 | <mark>72</mark> | <mark>1000000</mark> | 9% |
| USA | 60 | -1000000 | 8% |
| Luxembourg | 58 | -682021 | 5% |
| Italy | 49 | 660056 | 4% |
| Belgium | 44 | -632460 | 4% |
| Poland | 57 | -119637 | 1% |
| Cyprus | 61 | -12017 | 0% |
| | | | |
| Overall Vulnerability | | | |
| Outward FDI | 64 | | |

Table: Vulnerability of Burkina Faso's Inward FDI foreign direct investment stock in 2016

| | Burkina Faso | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Jurisdiction | SS | Inward FDI Stock (USD) | VulShare | | | | | | | |
| <mark>Barbados</mark> | <mark>74</mark> | <mark>573543196</mark> | <mark>37%</mark> | | | | | | | |
| Canada | 55 | 600468700 | 29% | | | | | | | |
| <mark>Bermuda</mark> | <mark>73</mark> | 233996775 | <mark>15%</mark> | | | | | | | |
| France | 52 | 177313974 | 8% | | | | | | | |
| Isle of Man | 64 | 68723469 | 4% | | | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 42 | -70997485 | 3% | | | | | | | |
| India | 52 | 40579082 | 2% | | | | | | | |
| <mark>Mauritius</mark> | <mark>72</mark> | <mark>11330068</mark> | <mark>1%</mark> | | | | | | | |
| Ghana | 62 | 10522086 | 1% | | | | | | | |
| Luxembourg | 58 | 8876875 | 0% | | | | | | | |
| Overall Vulnerability | | | | | | | | | | |
| Inward FDI | 63 | | <u>()</u> | | | | | | | |

Table: Vulnerability of Burkina Faso's Portfolio Investment Liabilities (derived) in 2016

| Burkina Faso | | | |
|---------------------------------|----|-----------------------------|----------|
| Jurisdiction | SS | Portfolio Liabilities (USD) | VulShare |
| France | 52 | 24776621 | 67% |
| United Kingdom | 42 | 8242340 | 18% |
| Guernsey | 72 | 1672000 | 6% |
| Jersey | 65 | 1230200 | 4% |
| Switzerland | 76 | 784449 | 3% |
| Luxembourg | 58 | 336331 | 1% |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Overall Vulnerability Portfolio | | | |
| Investment Liabilities | 52 | | |

Preliminary Conclusion

At Present

- Macro data driven analyses enable strategic and tactic orientation across a number of government administration departments (tax admin, central banks, financial intelligence units, customs/police, etc.)
- capacity building priorities (human and other resources)
- policy priorities (incl. treaty negotiation, anti-avoidance measures)
- audit priorities
- E.g. through checkup of current priorities/focus through country risk profiles (e.g. Burkina Faso, South Africa)

In Future

- Complement secrecy driven analyses with specific corporate tax haven indicators
- Partnering with tax administrations in Africa for advancing micro-/transaction level risk analyses e.g. with customs transaction level data, corporate registry data, tax returns, suspicious transaction reports, etc.

Forthcoming: Workshop on the IFF Risk Tool in Ouagadougou (12th September 2019)

Stop the Bleeding Campaign



Stop the Bleeding !

Campaign to End Illicit Financial Flows From Africa

http://stopthebleedinga frica.org/sign/



Sign the

petition

THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION !!!


Further information :

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https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/

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